26 To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming by William D. Nordhaus
26
To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative
Approaches to Slowing Global Warming
William D. Nordhaus∗
Howcancountriesbestcoordinatetheirpoliciestoslowglobalwarming?Thisstudyreviews
different approaches to the political and economic control of global public goods such
as global warming. It compares quantity-oriented mechanisms like the Kyoto Protocol
with price-type control mechanisms such as internationally harmonized carbon taxes.
The analysis focuses on such issues as the relationship to ultimate targets, performance
under conditions of uncertainty, volatility of induced carbon prices, the inefﬁciencies of
taxation and regulation, potential for corruption and accounting ﬁnagling, and ease of
implementation. It concludes that price-type approaches such as carbon taxes have major
advantages for slowing global warming.
Before discussing different approaches, it will be useful to sketch the scientiﬁc basis for
concerns about global warming. As a result of the buildup of atmospheric greenhouse gases
( G H G s ) ,i ti se x p e c t e dt h a ts i g n i ﬁ c a n tc l i m a techanges will occur in thecoming decades and
beyond. The major industrial GHGs are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, ozone, nitrous
oxides, and chloroﬂuorocarbons (CFCs). Using climate models as well as examining past
climatevariations,scientistsexpectsigniﬁcantclimaticchangesinthecomingyears.Current
estimates are that an increase that doubles the amount of CO2 or the equivalent in the
atmosphere compared with preindustrial levels will, in equilibrium, lead to an increase in
the global surface temperature of 1.5–4.5
◦C, an increase in precipitation and evaporation,
and a rise in sea levels of 10–90 cm over this century. Some models also predict regional
shifts,suchashotteranddrierclimatesinmidcontinentalregions,suchastheU.S.Midwest.
Climate monitoring indicates that the predicted global warming is occurring in line with
scientiﬁc predictions.1
While scientists have been analyzing global warming for more than half a century,
nations took the ﬁrst formal steps to slow global warming only about ﬁfteen years ago,
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). The ﬁrst
binding international agreement on climate change, the Kyoto Protocol, came into effect in
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1Extensive discussions on this subject are contained in reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, especially IPCC 2001, with evidence for recent warming in Hansen et al. (2006).
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2005, and the ﬁrst period for emissions reductions, 2008–2012, is at hand. The framework
for implementing the protocol is most solidly institutionalized in the European Union’s
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which covers almost half of Europe’s CO2 emissions
(EU ETS 2006; Klepper and Peterson 2005).
Notwithstanding this apparent success, the Kyoto Protocol is widely seen as a troubled
institution. Early problems appeared with the failure to include the major developing
countries, the lack of an agreed-upon mechanism to include new countries, and an
agreement that is limited to a single period. The major blow came when the United States
withdrew from the treaty in 2001. Whereas 65 percent of the 1990 world emissions were
included in the original protocol, that number had declined to 32 percent in 2002 with
the withdrawal of the United States and strong economic growth in noncovered countries,
largelythedevelopingnationsoftheworld.StrictenforcementoftheKyotoProtocolislikely
to be observed primarily in those countries and industries covered by the EU ETS. These
emissions today account for about 8 percent of global emissions. If the current protocol
is extended at the current reduction rates, models indicate that it will have little impact
on global climate change (Nordhaus and Boyer 1999; Manne and Richels 1999; Nordhaus
2001; MacCracken et al. 1999).
Nations are now beginning to consider the structure of climate-change policies for the
period after 2008–2012. Some countries, states, cities, companies, and even universities are
adopting their own climate-change policies. Most global-warming policies adopted by U.S.
states or considered by the U.S. federal government contain some mixture of emissions
limits and technology standards. Is the Kyoto Protocol a viable long-term approach to
this long-term problem? Are there alternatives that might reduce global warming more
efﬁciently? I consider these questions in this article.
The ﬁrst section describes the political and economic issues raised by global public goods
like global warming. It suggests that attempts to coordinate sovereign governments raise
thorny problems beyond those involved in most national pollution problems. The next
section describes the major mechanisms available to coordinate dealings with global public
goods. The subsequent section describes the three fundamental issues that must be resolved
inanyregimetoaddressclimatechange—thelevelofemissionsreductions,thedistributions
of emissions reductions across countries, and themechanismsto encourageparticipation of
low-income countries. I then describe the price-type approach of harmonized carbon taxes.
The penultimate section discusses speciﬁc concerns such as how well different approaches
meetultimateobjectives,theproblemofsettingbaselinesforpricesandquantities,treatment
of uncertainty in different approaches, the potential for great volatility in the market prices
of carbon under quantitative systems, public ﬁnance questions, problems of corruption,
and administrative issues. I close with a summary of the major issues.
Policies for Global Public Goods
Global warming is a member of a special type of economic activity known as global public
goods. These are economic or other activities whose impacts are indivisible and whose
inﬂuences are felt around the world rather than affecting one nation, town, or family. These
are not new phenomena. However, they are becoming increasingly prevalent because of
rapid technological change and the rapid decline in transportation and communication28 W. D. Nordhaus
costs. What makes global public goods different from other economic activities is that there
exist only weak economic and political mechanisms for solving these issues efﬁciently and
effectively.
Dealing with global public goods has been an increasingly important feature of
international relations. Aside from global warming, important examples are nuclear
proliferation, infectious diseases, intellectual property rights, international trade in goods
and services, macroeconomic stability, ﬁsheries, endangered species, and transnational
terrorism. We have only to think about recent crises such as those involving weapons of
mass destruction, the AIDS epidemic, international ﬁnancial crises, and the threat of avian
ﬂu to realize how prevalent global public goods are. A little further reﬂection will indicate
that nations have had only modest success in agreements to deal with global public goods.
There are but a few examples of regimes that manage international public goods effectively,
such as those managing international trade disputes (today primarily through the World
Trade Organization) and the CFC protocols.
There are major governance issues involved in dealing with global public goods. It is
necessary to locate decision making at a level in the hierarchy between the household and
a weak or nonexistent world government that can efﬁciently coordinate solutions. This is a
particularlythornyproblemforglobalpublicgoodsbecauseglobalcoordinationisrequired.
TheneedforglobaldecisionmakingleadstotheWestphaliandilemma.Underinternational
law as it developed in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and evolved in Western Europe,
obligations may be imposed on a sovereign state only with its consent. Because of the
structure of international law, therefore, there is no legal mechanism by which disinterested
majorities or even super majorities of countries can coerce noncooperating countries to
provide for global public goods. In other words, the Westphalian system is one that allows
free-riding. Therefore, we must take entirely different approaches to global public goods
compared with those taken for regional, national, or local public goods.
Economic and Focal Public Goods
Looking at the varieties of global public goods, I want to focus on those I will call economic
public goods. These activities involve huge numbers of economic agents in a large number
of countries, in which the costs and beneﬁts of action do not indicate any obvious focal
policy or technological ﬁx. By contrast, I denote as focal public goods those activities in
which good policies appear obvious or consensual to most people; for example, it does not
take much persuasion to convince people that a reasonable standard is zero AIDS, zero
smallpox, zero ﬁnancial collapses, zero nuclear meltdowns, or zero nuclear explosions.
With economic public goods, by contrast, it is difﬁcult to determine and reach agreement
on efﬁcient policies because they involve estimating and balancing costs and beneﬁts where
neither is easy to measureand both involvemajor distributional concerns. Economic public
goods include ﬁsheries (where the point of overﬁshing is difﬁcult to calculate), pollution
(where zero pollution is prohibitively expensive), and global warming (where it is apparent
that the optimal abatement is today somewhat short of 100 percent of GHG emissions).
There is a temptation to redeﬁne economic public goods as focal public goods because that
tremendously simpliﬁes analysis and policy. For example, policies have pretended to adopt
acompletephase-outofCFCsinprinciple,althoughthatisimpossibleinpractice.Similarly,Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming 29
policies to prevent the extinctions of species generally avoid the vexing question of how to
draw the line between species and subspecies as well as the intractable question of how far
to lower the probability of extinction given that it clearly can never be zero.
Speciﬁc Mechanisms to Deal with Global Public Goods
Nations have forged a variety of frameworks for dealing with global public goods and
other transnational issues, employing a wide variety of instruments or techniques (Barrett
2003). A partial list is (i) noncooperative, market-based, or laissez-faire approaches (as is
currently the case for production of most goods and services as well as for some potential
global issues such as asteroid defense); (ii) aspirational or hortatory agreements that urge
countries to undertake actions (e.g., the FCCC) or nonbinding voluntary agreements (e.g.,
the institutional regime created in the 1980s to clean up pollution in the North Sea);
(iii) speciﬁc and binding treaties, legal contracts among sovereign nations, which are the
standard way to deal with international issues (currently in effect for CFCs and many other
global environmental agreements); (iv) agreements embedded in broader international
institutions or agreements (exempliﬁed when Western nations forced developing countries
to accept strong patent protection under the last multilateral trade negotiations); and
(v) limited delegations of regulatory or ﬁscal authority to supranational bodies (seen in
some European activities such as the European Central Bank, in some powers of the
World Trade Organization [WTO], and in some the international ﬁnancial institutions).
This array of international institutions reminds us that although global warming is a new
problem, the problems of international political economy raised by global warming are
quite ancient.
When dealing with economic public goods like global warming, it is necessary to reach
through governments to the multitude of ﬁrms and consumers who make the vast number
of decisions that affect the ultimate outcomes. There are two major mechanisms that can
beemployed—quantitativelimits throughgovernment ﬁat andregulation, and price-based
approaches through fees, subsidies, or taxes.2
In the global-warming context, quantitative limits set targets on the time path of GHG
emissions of different countries. Countries then can administer these limits in their own
fashion, and the mechanism may allow transfer of emissions allowances among countries,
as is the case under the Kyoto Protocol. This approach has limited international experience
under existing protocols such as the CFC mechanisms and broader experience under
national trading regimes such as the U.S. SO2 allowance-trading program.
The second approach is to use harmonized prices, fees, or taxes as a method of
coordinating policies among countries. This approach has no international experience in
the environmental area, although it has considerable national experience for environmental
markets in such areas as the U.S. tax on ozone-depleting chemicals. On the other hand, the
use of harmonized price-type measures has extensive international experience in ﬁscal and
trade policies, such as with the harmonization of taxes in the EU and harmonized tariffs in
international trade.
2This distinction is drastically simpliﬁed. For a nuanced discussion including variants and hybrids, see
Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins (2003) and the many references and proposals therein.30 W. D. Nordhaus
Major Issues in Any International Climate-change Regime
Any climate-change regime must face three fundamental issues—the overall level and
trajectory of emissions reduction (reﬂected in a control rate or a market price of carbon
emissions), the distribution of emissions reductions across countries, and the need for
mechanisms to encourage participation of low-income countries and other reluctant
countries. Each of these issues is very contentious.
The Overall Level and Trajectory of Emissions Reduction
Because global warming is a global public good, the key environmental issue is global
emissions, and the key economic issue is how to balance costs and beneﬁts of global
emissions reductions. Climate change depends only upon total GHG emissions and the
time path of emissions, not on the geographic location of emissions. Moreover, the impacts
depend primarily upon cumulative emissions that remain in the atmosphere, not on the
annual ﬂow of emissions.
Under a price approach, the level of emissions is determined indirectly by the level of
the tax or penalty levied on carbon emissions. Under a quantitative approach, the level of
emissions is directly chosen. However, a market economy is likely to develop markets for
emissions permits, and a market price will therefore emerge. An economist will naturally
examine the price in either case, and the ﬁrst issue can be rephrased as: What is the level of
the market price of carbon emissions that is consistent with the regime?
A quantitative measure of the tightness of emissions controls is the value of the ‘‘carbon
price,’’ ‘‘carbon tax,’’ or the ‘‘social cost of carbon.’’ The carbon price measures the market
price attached to the right to emit 1 ton of carbon through burning fossil fuels or other
activities. For calibrationpurposes, if a hundred-dollar-per-toncarbontax wereto belevied
on gasoline, that would raise the price by twenty cents per gallon.3
The key economic question under any regime is whether the price is likely to be high
or low. We can examine these questions quantitatively using computerized models built
to study the economics of global warming. These models are called ‘‘integrated-assessment
models,’’ or IAMs. The use of IAMs has blossomed over the last two decades, and there are
now dozens of global models and even larger numbers of models that apply to individual
countries.
Carbonprices inefﬁcient emissionsreductions
The question of the ‘‘optimal’’ level of emissions reductions is undoubtedly the most
difﬁcult and controversial question in the economics of global warming. In a series of
studies, my coauthors and I have estimated cost and damage functions and estimated
‘‘optimal’’ or efﬁcient emissions reductions to slow global warming. The results discussed
here use the ‘‘RICE model’’ (regional integrated model of climate and the economy), which
3Scientists and economists have customarily measured carbon prices in terms of carbon weight, and I
follow that convention. Current emissions-trading programs generally quote in terms of carbon dioxide
weight, which has a mass 3.67 times that of carbon. To convert from the carbon units to the CO2 units,
multiply the mass or divide the price by 3.67.Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming 31
is an IAM that analyzes the major economic trade-offs involved in global warming. It uses
theframeworkofeconomicgrowththeoryandincorporates emissionsandclimatemodules
to analyze alternative paths of future economic growth and global warming.
The latest calculation in the deterministic aggregate RICE model suggests that a 2010
carbon price of around $17 per ton carbon in 2005 prices—rising to $70 per ton in
2050—would efﬁciently balance the costs and beneﬁts of emissions reductions, that is,
maximize the present discounted value of beneﬁts minus costs.
It must be recognized that this estimate of the efﬁcient carbon tax is unlikely to capture
all the nonmarket aspects of global warming (such as effects on ecosystems), problems of
uncertainty and risk aversion, and the potential for ‘‘dangerous interferences’’ with many
global processes.4 Nonetheless, it does describe a path that recognizes that countries care
about their economic development as well as future costs of global warming.
Many other estimates exist for the appropriate market prices of carbon. At thehigh end is
the social cost of carbon proposal in the UK government’s Stern Review (2006) of $310 per
ton of carbon; the very bottom of $0 is implicit in the policies of global-warming skeptics
and the environmental skeptics in the G.W. Bush Administration. However, the relatively
low current efﬁcient market price of carbon found in the RICE model was one of the
major conclusions in a review of IAMs: ‘‘Perhaps the most surprising result is the consensus
that given calibrated interest rates and low future economic growth, modest controls are
generally optimal’’ (Kelly and Kolstad 1999).
Emissions reductionsand carbonprices inthe KyotoProtocol
Several studies have estimated the economic impacts of the Kyoto Protocol. Modeling
estimates indicate that global emissions under the Kyoto Protocol as actually operating
would be very close to a ‘‘no-controls’’ baseline, that is, a world without policy-induced
GHG emissions reductions. Estimates from the RICE model indicate that global CO2
emissionsinano-controlsworldwouldgrowbyabout27.5 percentbetween1990and2010,
whereas under the current version of the Kyoto Protocol global emissions growth over the
same time period would be around 26 percent. In other words, the analysis indicates that
global emissions in 2010 would be 1.5 percent lower than without controls (Figure 1).
Moreover, the RICE model and other studies estimated that the Kyoto Protocol would
lead to highly differentiated prices and therefore to an inefﬁcient allocation of abatement
across countries (Manne and Richels 1999, 2001; MacCracken et al. 1999; Nordhaus and
Boyer 2000; Nordhaus 2001). With the U.S. withdrawal from the protocol, global emissions
reductions and carbon prices are projected to be much lower than in the original version.
RICE model results indicate that the carbon price in 2010 would be $41 per ton of carbon
with the United States and $18 without the United States. With the United States out of the
picture, the price of permits in Europe would be dramatically lower because the required
emissions reductions for the participants would be much smaller.
4This term is motivated by the FCCC, which states, ‘‘The ultimate objective of this Convention ...is to
achieve ...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’’ (United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change at http://unfccc.int/2860.php).32 W. D. Nordhaus
-50%
-45%
-40%
-35%
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
1995 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
b
a
s
e
 
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
Original Kyoto Protocol
KP without U.S.
Limit to 2x CO2
Figure 1. Estimated emissions reductions for different regimes. Numbers are for total global industrial
CO2 emissions and measure the percentage reduction relative to a baseline path of no emissions
reductions. The Kyoto paths are ‘‘Kyoto forever’’ and assume that countries freeze their emissions at
the 2008–2012 average after the ﬁrst period with no extension in participation. The ‘‘Original Kyoto
Protocol’’ shows the impact of the protocol with United States participation. ‘‘KP without United States’’
shows the impact of removing the United States from the protocol. The ‘‘Limit to 2× CO2’’ shows
the emissions reductions that would minimize the discounted costs of limiting CO2 concentrations to
double preindustrial concentrations. The estimates are for the decades centered on the year shown on
the horizontal axis. Source: Nordhaus 2001.
The Distribution of Emissions or Emissions Reductions among Countries
What should be the distribution of emissions reductions among countries, and how should
the costs be allocated? These questions apply to differences among high- and low-income
countries,amonghigh-andlow-emittingcountries,andamonghigh-andlow-vulnerability
countries.
Economicsoffersasimple,unambiguous,butelusiveanswer:emissionsreductionsshould
be carried out in the most efﬁcient way; and the burden of reducing emissions should be
shared in a fair way. The ﬁrst half of this statement refers to the distribution of actual
emissions reductions (discussed in this section), while the second half refers to sharing the
costs among countries (which is discussed in the next section).
Emissions reductions will beefﬁcient or ‘‘costeffective’’ if the marginal costs of emissions
reductions are equalized across space and, with appropriate discounting, across time. The
spatial component of efﬁciency (‘‘where efﬁciency’’) is that the marginal cost of reductions
should be equalized across all countries, industries, and sources. The temporal component
(‘‘when efﬁciency’’ or intertemporal efﬁciency) is more complicated. When efﬁciency
requires that the proﬁle of emissions be timed to attain the ultimate goal (whether the
goal be concentrations or temperature stabilization or a dynamic cost–beneﬁt criterion). In
simple dynamic models, intertemporal efﬁciency requires that the market price of carbon
(equal to the marginal cost of emissions reductions) grows over time at a rate equal to theAlternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming 33
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Figure 2. Estimated abatement costs for different implementation strategies of the Kyoto Protocol.
This ﬁgure shows the discounted value of the costs of abatement and excludes any environmental
beneﬁts. Annex I includes high-income countries plus the ‘‘transition’’ economies of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union. Costs are discounted to 2005 and are in 2005 U.S. dollars. The Base case is with
no restraints on emissions and is by deﬁnition zero. The Efﬁcient case maximizes discounted net beneﬁts,
including environmental beneﬁts. Global is the case where the emissions under the Annex I countries
of the Kyoto Protocol are freely traded among all countries. AI trade is the basic Kyoto Protocol with
full trading of emissions allowances among Annex I countries only. No Trade allows no emissions trading
among the four major regions of Annex I. The underlying model is described in Nordhaus and Boyer
2000, updated in Nordhaus 2001.
‘‘real carbon interest rate,’’ which is approximately equal to the real interest rate less the
disappearance rate of CO2 from the atmosphere.
The Kyoto Protocol is defective on both spatial and temporal efﬁciency criteria because
it omits a substantial fraction of emissions (thus failing the spatial criterion) and has no
plans beyond the ﬁrst period (thus failing the temporal dimension of the cost-effectiveness
criterion). The two largest emitters (the United States and China) are not included in
the current protocol. Figure 2 shows the most recent estimates of abatement costs under
different trading regimes for the original Kyoto Protocol using the RICE model. Because
it limits trading to a small part of the world and ignores the intertemporal dimension, the
Kyoto Protocol is an extremely costly treaty and makes only modest progress in slowing
global warming.
Mechanisms to Encourage Participation
How should the economic burden of reducing emissions be shared among countries?
‘‘All politics are distributional,’’ is a maxim of American politics. This is no less true of
the politics of international environmental agreements. Neither science nor economics can
providea‘‘correct’’answertothequestionofhowtosharetheburdenofreducingemissions.
Disinterested observers might argue that the costs should be allocated on the basis of ability
to pay, with richer countries and generations paying a larger fraction of the costs. Interested34 W. D. Nordhaus
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Figure 3. Abatement costs of Kyoto Protocol with and without U.S. participation. This ﬁgure shows
the discounted value of the costs of abatement (emissions reductions) and excludes any environmental
beneﬁts. The ﬁrst four regions are participants and the last region (ROW) sums the impacts for all non-
participants. The burden of abatement shifts greatly with the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.
Source: Nordhaus 2001. OHI, other high-income countries, including Japan and Canada; Europe, primarily
the EU; EE, Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union; ROW, the rest of the world.
observers, such as negotiating countries, want to pay as little as possible, and are unlikely to
participate voluntarily unless they have a positive net beneﬁt.
The Kyoto Protocol has an arbitrary allocation of burdens and transfers because it
generally used 1990 emissions as a base year when setting targets in the negotiations during
1997. Consequently, those countries with high emissions in 1990 (such as Russia) are
advantaged while those whose emissions have subsequently grown rapidly (such as the
United States) are disadvantaged.
TheresultoftheinitialallocationisthattheKyotoProtocolwashamperedatitsinception
by a distribution of abatement costs that was weighted heavily toward the United States
Figure 3 shows the RICE model estimates of the costs of abatement for different regions
with and without U.S. participation. This study suggested that the United States would bear
a largefraction of thecosts of implementing theprotocol. Indeed, theestimated net beneﬁts
for the United States, including environmental beneﬁts (not shown), were negative. At the
other extreme, it seems likely that Russia was induced to participate because it would have
excess allowances that could be exported.
Justasthornyarequestionsinvolvingtheparticipationoflow-incomecountries.Efﬁciency
requires full participation of low-income counties in emissions reductions; indeed some
of the most economical emissions reductions can be found in low-income countries. But
including low-income countries is challenging for many reasons—fairness, development
priorities,andpurebargainingstrategies.Inanymechanism,itseemslikelythathigh-income
countries will provide ﬁnancial and technical assistance to low-income countries to induce
participation.Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming 35
In both the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries were excluded from any
obligations to reduce emissions. This approach was probably a fundamental mistake. It is
crucial to have a mechanism whereby countries ‘‘graduate’’ into a set of obligations that
are commensurate with their abilities to pay—in a way that is similar to the ‘‘ability to
pay’’ principle of an income tax system. Part of the challenge is designing a fair graduation
procedure; another part is overcoming the Westphalian dilemma of inducing countries to
participate when graduation day comes.
Price Approaches to Climate Change
Attemptstoaddressclimatechangethroughpricesratherthanquantitieshavebeendiscussed
in a handful of papers in the economics literature (see Cooper 1998; Pizer 1998; Victor
2001; Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003), but much careful analysis remains to be done. I will
highlight a few of the details.
For concreteness, I will discuss a mechanism called harmonized carbon taxes (HCT).
Underthisapproach,therearenobindinginternationalornationalemissionslimits.Rather,
countries would agree to penalize carbon emissions at an internationally harmonized
‘‘carbon price’’ or ‘‘carbon tax.’’ Conceptually, the carbon tax is a dynamically efﬁcient
Pigovian tax that balances the discounted social marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts of
additional emissions. The carbon price might be determined by estimates of the price
necessary to limit GHG concentrations or temperature changes below some level thought
to be ‘‘dangerous interference,’’ or it might be the price that would induce the efﬁcient
level of control. Unlike the quantitative approach under the Kyoto Protocol, there would
be no country emissions quotas, no emissions trading, and no base period emissions levels.
Because carbon prices would be equalized, the approach would be spatially efﬁcient among
those countries that have a harmonized set of taxes. If the carbon tax trajectory follows the
rules for ‘‘when efﬁciency,’’ it would also satisfy intertemporal efﬁciency.
Details about burden sharing would require study and negotiations. It would be
reasonable to allow participation to depend upon the level of economic development. For
example, countries might be expected to participate fully when their incomes reach a given
threshold (perhaps $10,000 per capita), and poor countries might receive transfers for early
participation.Theissuesofsanctions,thelocationoftaxation,internationaltradetreatment,
and transfers to developing countries under an HCT are important details that require
discussion and reﬁnement. If carbon prices are equalized across participating countries,
there will be no need for tariffs or border tax adjustments among participants. I emphasize
thatmuchworkwouldneedtobedonetoﬂeshoutthesearrangements,buttheyarefamiliar
terrain because countries have dealt with problems of tariffs, subsidies, and differential tax
treatment for many years. Some of the thorny administrative issues are discussed below.
Hybrid Approaches
The literature on regulatory mechanisms entertains a much richer set of approaches than
the polar quantity and price types that are examined here. An important variant is ‘‘prices
in quantity clothing’’—putting ceilings on the price of emissions-trading permits by
combining a tradable permit system with a government promise to sell additional permits36 W. D. Nordhaus
at a speciﬁed price (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002; Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins 2003). Price
caps were considered and rejected by the Clinton Administration in its preparation for the
negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol.
The present analysis focuses on the pure strains of the two systems to keep the analysis
within manageable limits. From a practical point of view, mixed systems sometimes revert
to their archetypes. For example, even though the Kyoto Protocol was designed to allow
complete trading among the participants, there have been strong pressures to limit trading
andforcecountriestomakemuchoftheirreductionsdomestically.TheEUimplementation
oftheKyotoProtocolallowsfull tradingwithintheEUbutlimitsthepurchasesofemissions
permits from other countries. The lesson from foreign-trade barriers, where price and
quantity limits have a much longer history, is that the quantity limits imposed through
quotas are extremely durable.
Comparison of Price and Quantity Approaches
The Kyoto Protocol lacks any connection to ultimate economic or environmental policy
objectives.Freezingemissionsatagivenhistoricallevelforagroupofcountriesisnotrelated
to any identiﬁable goals for concentrations, temperature, costs, damages, or ‘‘dangerous
interferences.’’ Nor does it bear any relationship to an economically oriented strategy that
would minimize the costs of attaining environmental and economic objectives.
Price-type systems such as taxes have a mixed record of efﬁciency. In this context, the
ideal system for a harmonized carbon tax is relatively simple, as described above. Because of
its conceptual simplicity, it might prove simpler to design an efﬁcient tax than an efﬁcient
quantity mechanism.
Setting Baselines for Prices and Quantities
Quantitylimitsareparticularlytroublesomewheretargetsmustadopttogrowingeconomies,
differential economic growth, uncertain technological change, and evolving science. These
problems are especially prominent under the Kyoto Protocol, which set its targets thirteen
yearsbeforethedateonwhichthecontrolsbecomeeffective(2008–2012),andusedbaseline
emissions from twenty years before the control period. Base year emissions have become
increasinglyasobsoleteastheeconomicandenergystructures,andevenpoliticalboundaries
of countries have changed.
The baselines for future budget periods and for new participants will present deep
problems for extensions of a quantity regime like the Kyoto Protocol. A natural baseline
for the post-2012 period would be a no-controls level of emissions. That level is in practice
impossible to calculate or predict with accuracy for countries with abatement policies
in place. Problems would arise in the future as to how to adjust baselines for changing
conditions and to take into account the extent of past emissions reductions.
Under a price approach, the natural baseline is a zero carbon tax or penalty. Countries’
efforts are then judged relative to that baseline. It is not necessary to construct a historical
base year of emissions. Countries are not advantaged or disadvantaged by their past policies
or the choice of arbitrary dates. The question of existing energy taxes may raise similar
complications, and I address these below. Moreover, there is no asymmetry between earlyAlternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming 37
joinersandlatejoiners,andearlyparticipantsarenotdisadvantagedbyhavingtheirbaseline
adjusted downward.
Treatment of Uncertainty
Uncertainty pervades climate-change science, economics, and policy. One key difference
betweenpriceandquantityinstrumentsishowwelleachadaptstodeepuncertainty.Amajor
result from environmental economics is that the relative efﬁciency of price and quantity
regulation depends upon the nature—and more precisely the degree of non-linearity—of
costsandbeneﬁts(Weitzman1974).Ifcostsarehighlynonlinearcomparedtobeneﬁts,then
price-type regulation is more efﬁcient; conversely, if the beneﬁts are highly nonlinear while
the costs are close to linear, then quantity-type regulation is more efﬁcient.
While this issue has received scant attention in the design of climate-change policies,
the structure of the costs and damages in global warming gives a strong presumption to
price-type approaches. The reason is that the beneﬁts are related to the stock of GHGs,
while the costs are related to the ﬂow of emissions. This implies that the marginal costs
of emissions reductions are highly sensitive to the level of reductions, while the marginal
beneﬁts of emissions reductions are close to independent of the current level of emissions
reductions (Pizer 1999; Hoel and Karp 2001). This combination means that emissions fees
or taxes are likely to be much more efﬁcient than quantitative standards or tradable quotas
when there is considerable uncertainty. This insight applies far beyond global warming to
any stock public good.
Volatility of the Market Prices of Tradable Allowances
Uncertainties affect prices. Because supply, demand, and regulatory conditions evolve
unpredictably over time, quantity-type regulations are likely to cause volatile trading prices
of carbon emissions. Price volatility for allowances is likely to be particularly high because
of the complete inelasticity of the supply of permits along with highly inelastic demand for
permits in the short run.
The history of European trading prices for CO2 illustrates the extreme volatility of
quantity systems. Over 2006, the range of trading prices has been from $44.47 to $143.06
per ton carbon (Point Carbon 2006). The prices of allowances fell by more than 70 percent
in one month because of new regulatory information.
Moreextensiveevidencewiththetradingofquantitativeenvironmentalallowancescomes
from the history of the U.S. sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions-trading program. This program
includes an annual auction conducted by the EPA as well as private markets, in which
ﬁrms and individuals can buy and sell allowances. The comparison between SO2 prices
and carbon trading prices is useful because of the similar economic characteristics of the
respective markets. Both markets are ones in which the supply is ﬁxed or near-ﬁxed in the
short run. Moreover, for each market, the demand is highly inelastic because it involves
the substitution between a fuel (such as coal) and other inputs, where the technology is
relatively inﬂexible in the short run and substitution is therefore limited. To some extent,
the volatility can be moderated if an agreement allows banking and borrowing, meaning
that countries can draw from future emissions allowances, or saveallowances for thefuture.38 W. D. Nordhaus
But programs are unlikely to allow borrowing, and banking provides only limited relief
from price volatility.
We can gain some insight into the likely functioning of CO2 allowances by examining
the historical volatility of the price of SO2 allowances. Spot SO2 prices at the annual EPA
auction have varied from a low of $66 per ton in 1996 to a high of $860 per ton in 2005.
Futures prices have varied by a factor of 4.7 (EPA 2006). If we look at the private market,
we ﬁnd that allowance prices have varied by a factor of 69 in the 1995–2006 period and
by a factor of 12 in the 2001–2006 period. Some changes have been induced by changes in
regulatory policies, but that feature would be relevant for the carbon market as well.
We can obtain a more precise measure of variability by calculating the statistical
‘‘volatility’’ of the prices of SO2 emissions allowances and comparing them with other
volatile prices. Volatility measures the average absolute month-to-month change, and is a
common approach to indicating the variability and unpredictability of asset prices. Figure 4
shows the estimated volatility of four prices for the period 1995–2005: the consumer price
index, stock prices, SO2 allowance prices, and oil prices. SO2 prices are much more volatile
than stock prices (or than the prices of other assets such as houses, not shown); they are
vastly more volatile than most consumer prices; and their volatility is close to that of oil
prices.
Such rapid ﬂuctuations are costly and undesirable, particularly for an input (carbon)
whose aggregate costs might be as great as petroleum in the coming decades. An analogous
situationoccurredintheUnited Statesduring themonetaristexperiment of1979–82,when
the Federal Reserve targeted quantities (monetary aggregates) rather than prices (interest
rates). During that period, interest rates were extremely volatile. In part owing to the
increased volatility, the Fed changed back to a price-type approach after a short period
of experimentation (Poole 1970). This experience suggests that a regime of strict quantity
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Figure 4. Prices of sulfur emissions allowances show high volatility. This ﬁgure shows the estimated
volatility of four prices over the 1995–2006 period. These are, from left to right, the consumer price
index (CPI), the stock price index for the Standard and Poor 500 (S&P500), the price of U.S. SO2
allowances (SO2 prices), and the price of crude oil (Oil price). Volatility is calculated as the annualized
absolute logarithmic month-to-month change. Source: Oil prices, CPI, and stock prices from DRI database
available at Yale University. Prices of SO2 permits are spot prices provided by Denny Ellerman and reﬂect
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limits might have major disruptive effects on energy markets and on investment planning,
as well as on the distribution of income across countries, inﬂation rates, energy prices, and
import and export values. It might consequently become extremely unpopular with market
participants and economic policymakers.
Public Finance Questions
Another important merit of carbon taxes is the strong ﬁscal-policy advantage of using
revenue-raising measures. When tax or regulatory restrictions raise goods prices, this
increases inefﬁciency losses from the existing tax system. The reasoning is that the existing
tax and regulatory system raises prices above efﬁcient levels. Adding further taxes or
regulations to existing ones increases the inefﬁciency or ‘‘deadweight loss’’ of the existing
system and should be counted as part of the additional costs of global-warming policy. This
effect is the ‘‘double burden’’ of taxation, analyzed in the theory of the ‘‘double dividend’’
from green taxes (Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw 1997; Goulder and Bovenberg 1996.)
If the carbon constraints are imposed through taxes, and the revenues are returned by
reducing taxes onothergoods orinputs, thentheincreased efﬁciency lossfrom taxationcan
be mitigated, so that there is no net increase in deadweight loss. If the constraints under a
quantity-based system are imposed by allocations that do not raise revenues, however, then
there is no mechanism to mitigate the increased deadweight loss. This is an important issue,
as the inefﬁciency losses can be as large as abatement costs.
While it is possible that emissions permits will be auctioned (thereby generating revenues
with which the tax burden can be mitigated), practice suggests that most of the permits
would be allocated at zero cost to ‘‘deserving’’ parties, or distributed to reduce political
resistance. In the cases of SO2 allowances and CFC production allowances, virtually all
the permits were allocated at no cost to producers. The major conclusion is that using
tax approaches rather than quantity-type approaches will help promote a more efﬁcient
collection and recycling of the revenues from the carbon constraints.
Rents, Corruption, and the Resource Curse
An additional question, applying particularly to international environmental agreements,
c o n c e r n st h ea d m i n i s t r a t i o no fp r o g r a m si naw o r l di nw h i c hg o v e r n m e n t sv a r yi nt e r m so f
honesty, transparency, and effective administration. Quantity-type systems are much more
susceptible to corruption than price-type regimes. An emissions-trading system creates
valuable assets in the form of tradable emissions permits and allocates these to countries.
Limiting emissions creates a scarcity where none previously existed. It is a rent-creating
program.Thedangersofquantityascomparedtopriceapproacheshavebeendemonstrated
frequently when quotas are compared with tariffs in international trade interventions.
Rents lead to rent-seeking behavior. Additionally, resource rents may increase
unproductive activity, civil and international wars, and slow economic growth—this
being the theory of the ‘‘resource curse’’ (Sachs and Warner 1995; Torvik 2002). The scarce
permits can be used by the country’s leaders for nonenvironmental purposes rather than to
reduce emissions. Dictators and corrupt administrators could sell part of their permits, and
pocket the proceeds.40 W. D. Nordhaus
Calculations suggest that tens of billions of dollars of permits may be available for foreign
sale from Russia under the Kyoto Protocol. Given the history of privatizing valuable public
assets at artiﬁcially low prices, it would not be surprising if the carbon market became
tangled in corrupt practices, undermining the legitimacy of the process. We might also
imagine a Kyoto Protocol extended to developing countries. Consider the case of Nigeria,
which had carbon emissions of around 100 million tons in recent years. If Nigeria were
allocated tradable allowances equal to recent emissions and could sell them for $20 per
ton of carbon, this would raise around $2 billion of hard currency annually—in a country
whose nonoil exports in 2000 were only $600 million.
Problemsofﬁnancialﬁnaglingarenotlimitedtopoor,weak,orautocraticstates.Concerns
arise in the wake of the recent accounting scandals in the United States. A cap-and-trade
system relies upon accurate measurement of emissions or fossil fuel use by sources in
participatingcountries.IfﬁrmA(orcountryA)sellsemissions(orcarbon-content)permits
to ﬁrm B (or country B), where both A and B are operating under caps, then it is essential
to monitor the emissions (or fuel use) of A and B to make sure that their emissions (fuel
use) are within their speciﬁed limits. Indeed, if monitoring is ineffective in country A but
effective in country B, a trading program could actually end up raising the level of global
emissions because A’s emissions would be unchanged while B’s would rise. Incentives to
evade emissions limitations in an international system are even stronger than the incentives
for tax evasion. Tax cheating is a zero-sum game for the company and the government,
while emissions evasion is a positive sum game for the two parties.
A price approach gives less room for corruption because it does not create artiﬁcial
scarcities, monopolies, or rents. There are no permits transferred to countries or leaders of
countries, so they cannot be sold abroad for wine or guns. There is no new rent-seeking
opportunity. Any revenues would need to be raised by taxation on domestic consumption
of fuels, and a carbon tax would add absolutely nothing to the rent-producing instruments
that countries have today.
Administrative and Measurement Issues
One objection to the carbon-tax approach concerns its administration. The issue has been
analyzed by David Victor in his analysis of the Kyoto Protocol:
Monitoring and enforcement [of a carbon tax approach] are extremely difﬁcult....I n
practice, it would be extremely difﬁcult to estimate the practical effect of the tax, which
is what matters. For example, countries could offset a tax on emissions with less visible
compensatory policies that offer loopholes for energy-intensive and export-oriented
ﬁrmsthatwouldbemostadverselyaffectedbythenewcarbontax.Theresultinggoulash
of prior distortions, new taxes, and political patches could harm the economy and also
undermine the goal of making countries internalize the full cost of their greenhouse gas
emissions. (Victor 2001, 86)
Suchconcernsareserious. Themajorobstacletoenforcement isthemeasurementof‘‘net
carbon taxes.’’ As Victor notes, we would need to measure net carbon taxes in the context
of other ﬁscal policies (such as fuel taxes and coal subsidies). For example, suppose that
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same time increase coal subsidies to offset the carbon tax, thereby reducing the level of net
carbon taxes. Alternatively, Canada might argue that it has met its carbon-tax obligations
by raising provincial stumpage charges on timber. How would the carbon tax be calculated
in such circumstances?
One approach would be to calculate the net taxation of carbon fuels, including all taxes
and subsidies on energy products, but not to go beyond this to indirect, embodied impacts
(i.e., carbon used to produce inputs into production) outside of exceptional cases. Such a
calculation would require two steps. First, each country would provide a full set of taxes and
subsidies relating to the energy sector; second, we would need an appropriate methodology
for combining the different numbers into an overall carbon tax rate. A ﬁnal issue is how to
count initial taxes.
Obtaining data oncountrytax rates
The ﬁrst issue—obtaining tax rates—is relatively straightforward for market economies.
One of the proponents of the tax approach, Richard Cooper, describes the monitoring issue
as follows:
Monitoring the imposition of a common carbon tax would be easy. The tax’s
enforcement would be more difﬁcult to monitor, but all important countries except
Cuba and North Korea hold annual consultations with the International Monetary
Fund on their macroeconomic policies, including the overall level and composition
of their tax revenues. The IMF could provide reports to the monitoring agent of the
treaty governing greenhouse gas emissions. Such reports could be supplemented by
international inspection both of the major taxpayers, such as electric utilities, and the
tax agencies of participating countries. (Cooper 1998)
Additionally, the levels of taxes and subsidies are generally public knowledge, particularly
in market democracies, where they are part of the legislative process. On the other hand,
countries with closed political systems might attempt to hide their subsidies. This problem
would be particularly troublesome in nonmarket economies or in sectors in which fuels are
allocated directly rather than by the price mechanism. Direct allocation is becoming the
exception rather than the rule in the world today, however.
Conceptual issuesin measuringtax rates
Thesecondissue,calculatingtheeffectivecarbontaxfromtheunderlyingdata,isatechnical
economic issue. Calculations would require conventions about how to convert energy taxes
into their carbon equivalent. Some of the calculations involve conversion ratios (from
coal or oil to carbon equivalent) that underpin any control system. Others would require
input–output coefﬁcients, which might not be universally available on a timely basis. On
the whole, calculations of effective carbon tax rates are straightforward as long as they do
not involve indirect or embodied emissions.
To go beyond ﬁrst-round calculations to indirect effects would require assumptions
about supply and demand elasticities and cross-elasticities, might engender disputes among
countries, and should be avoided if possible. The procedures would probably require
mechanisms similar to those used in WTO deliberations, where technical experts would42 W. D. Nordhaus
need tocalculateeffectivetaxesunderasetofguidelines thatwouldevolveunder quasi-legal
procedures. Many of these issues are discussed in the literature on ecological taxes (von
Weizs¨ acker and Jesinghaus, 1992).
Howtocount initial carbontaxes
A ﬁnal issue involves the question of how to count initial carbon taxes. Some
countries—particularly those in Europe—might claim that they already have high carbon-
equivalent taxes because of high taxes on gasoline. They would argue for taking existing
taxes into account before requiring them to undergo further obligations.
Whilethislookslikeasubterfuge,countingpre-existingtaxesascomplianceisappropriate
and is easily seen as such in the carbon-tax framework. From the point of view of global
efﬁciency, it makes no sense for countries with high existing taxes to add further penalties
on top of existing ones before countries with subsidies or no penalties impose their carbon
taxes. Therefore, the ﬁrst step, and one absent from analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, would
be a calculation of existing equivalent carbon taxes and subsidies. Nordhaus and Boyer
calculated that, even without CO2 taxes, Europe is taxing carbon at a rate of approximately
one hundred dollars per ton of carbon more than the United States (Nordhaus and Boyer,
2000).Giventhatdisparity,it wouldmakenoeconomicsensetorequireEuropetoaddeven
higher carbon taxes on top of its existing ones before other countries impose even modest
carbon taxes.
Conclusion
We are just beginning to understand and cope with the ‘‘great geophysical experiment’’ of
globalwarming(RavelleandSeuss,1957).Inthisarticle,Isuggestthatprice-typeapproaches
such as HCTs are more efﬁcient instruments than quantity approaches like those found
in the Kyoto Protocol. Under the tax approach, countries set market penalties on GHG
emissions at levels that are equalized across different regions and industries. The tax would
start relatively low and then, unless the outlook changes for better or worse, rise steadily
over time to reﬂect the increasing prospective damages from global warming.
Many considerations enter the balance in weighing prices and quantities. One advantage
of price-type approaches is that they can more easily and ﬂexibly integrate economic costs
and beneﬁts of emissions reductions, whereas the approach in the Kyoto Protocol has no
discernible connection with ultimate environmental or economic goals. This advantage is
emphatically reinforced by the large uncertainties and the evolving scientiﬁc knowledge in
this area. Emissions taxes are more efﬁcient in the face of massive uncertainties because
of the relative linearity of the beneﬁts compared with the costs. A related point is that
quantitative limits will produce high volatility in the market price of carbon under an
emissions-targeting approach. In addition, a tax approach can capture the revenues more
easily than quantitative approaches, and may add less to the distortion caused by existing
taxes.Thetaxapproachalsoprovideslessopportunityforcorruptionandﬁnancialﬁnagling
than quantitative limits, because it creates no artiﬁcial scarcities to encourage rent-seeking
behavior.Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming 43
However, we must be realistic about the shortcomings of the price-based approach. It is
unfamiliar ground in international environmental agreements. Tax is almost a four-letter
word. Many people distrust price approaches in general; they are of special concern for
global warming because they do not impose explicit limitations on the growth in emissions
or the concentrations of GHGs. We might fear that the international community could
ﬁddle with tax rates and deﬁnitions and measurement issues and coverage while the planet
burns. These are real concerns and will require time and patience to address and overcome.
The coming years will undoubtedly witness intensive negotiations on global warming as
the planet warms, theoceans rise, and new ecological and economic impacts are discovered,
especially if threats of abrupt or catastrophic impacts become more likely. A dilemma will
arise particularly if, as has been suggested above, the quantitative approach under theKyoto
Protocol proves ineffective and inefﬁcient. As policy makers search for more effective and
efﬁcient ways to slow dangerous climatic change, they should consider the possibility that
price-type approaches like harmonized taxes on carbon are powerful tools for coordinating
policies and slowing global warming.
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